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During the American Civil War, the rifle was the most common weapon found on the battlefield. Most of the rifles during that time were loaded with a small lead musket ball or with a minnie ball (or Minié ball) and black powder. Most rifles of this era were muzzle loaded rifled muskets. These rifles were used by both the United States of America ("Union") and the Confederate States of America. ==Background== In the decades leading up to the Civil War, numerous advances had been made in weapons. The flintlock, which had been in use for almost two hundred years, had been replaced by the caplock in the 1840s. Rifles had been in use for many years, but prior to the civil war had been rare in military use. The black powder at the time quickly fouled the barrel, making reloading slower and more difficult. Round balls did not fit so tightly into the barrel, and therefore did not suffer from the slow loading problem common to rifles. Black powder also quickly obscured the battlefield, which led military leaders of the time to conclude that the greater range of rifles was of little value on the battlefield. Military leaders therefore preferred the faster loading smooth bore weapons over the more accurate rifles. The invention of the Minié ball solved the slow loading problem, allowing smoothbore muskets to be replaced by rifles in the decades just before the civil war. In addition, most existing military doctrine was based around the smoothbore musket. Since the 17th century, infantry normally fought in a tight shoulder-to-shoulder line and fired volleys at each other. When one side gained the upper hand, they would finish off the attack with a bayonet charge. These tactics developed because smoothbore muskets were only accurate at short ranges. Rifles made this type of fighting obsolete because of their much greater range. In Civil War battles, infantry typically fought in a widely-spread out line, with the men using trees, rocks, buildings, etc. for cover. Linear formations were thus rarely seen any more (although it did occur in the Battle of Brawner's Farm the evening before Second Bull Run). However, most American army officers in 1861 had been schooled in obsolete Napoleonic tactics, especially since many of them had served in the Mexican War, which was still fought in the old way with smoothbore muskets and linear formations. As such, officers typically failed to realize the power of rifles and continued to launch massed attacks against fortified enemies, which invariably resulted in heavy losses. For years, one of the standard manuals used in the US Army had been an 1835 translation by General Winfield Scott of a French work. Shortly before the Civil War, William J. Hardee (later to become a Confederate lieutenant general) updated it to include information on rifles, but he still assumed the use of linear formations in the book. Nonetheless, Hardee's book was produced in a huge variety of editions during the war, often for different types of infantry. For instance, one was produced specially for African-American troops, and another for Zouave units. There were many Southern editions, and at least one Northern edition that omitted Hardee's name from the title page. However, historians such as Allen C. Guelzo reject this traditional criticism of Civil War infantry tactics. Casualty estimates compared with expended ammunition from battles indicate 1 casualty for every 250 - 300 shots discharged, not a dramatic improvement over Napoleonic casualty rates. No contemporary accounts indicate that engagement ranges with substantial casualties between infantry occurred at ranges beyond Napoleonic engagement ranges. To explain this seeming contradiction between technology and tactical reality, Guelzo points out that even when laboratory tests indicates accuracy with a rifled musket from 600 yards, in an actual battlefield situation, the lack of smokeless powder quickly would obscure visibility. The gunpowder of the time produced a great deal of smoke when fired. Thus, in larger battles, battles began with artillery firing for some time, and skirmishers had been firing at each other for some time. By the time the main lines of infantry began approaching each other, visibility was significantly obscured. Once the infantry began the main engagement, visibility quickly was reduced to almost nil. With the lack of visibility, only massed infantry fire was effective, and this reality is reflected in the tactics of the time. Guelzo argues that rifling only truly benefited the sharpshooters on the skirmish line, who fought before their visibility was obscured, but the main line of infantry could not take advantage of the benefits of rifling. In Gettysburg, the Last Invasion, (Guelzo, Allen C. (2013). Gettysburg: The Last Invasion. Knopf. p. 656. ISBN 978-0-30-759408-2.) Guelzo also points out the technical difficulty of aiming a rifled musket. While rifling improved overall accuracy of muskets, the rifling also formed a trajectory that caused the bullet to quickly "drop" from where it was aimed (in contrast to the flat trajectory of smoothbore muskets). Thus to hit a target at distances beyond 40-50 yards, the rifleman would require knowledge of trajectory and distance, aiming the rifle at a precise angle above the target. In actual battlefield situations, such precise aiming was virtually impossible. Under the stress of battle, virtually every infantryman asked about aiming on the battlefield replied that in practice, the best one could do was "simply raise his rifle to the horizontal, and fire without aiming." (Guelzo p. 62). Thus Guelzo doubts that contemporary military leaders blatantly ignored technological advances. Rather, Guelzo argued that in actual battlefield conditions, until the development of smokeless powder, the benefits of rifling were largely nullified. Therefore, generals did not alter their tactics not due to ignorance, but because the battlefield had not changed substantially from the Napoleonic era. Even worse was the state of cavalry tactics. Traditionally, mounted soldiers carried a lance, sword, or pistol and could sweep enemy infantry weakened by artillery or musket fire. Napoleon normally always tried to rout opposing armies from the field after softening their line with massed artillery barrages. The Napoleonic cavalry charge was thus made both obsolete and suicidal by rifles. At least two major battles in the Civil War, Gaines Mill and Gettysburg, saw such attempts, both with predictable results. As a result, cavalry came to be used mainly for raiding and scouting, and seldom participated in major battles. Mounted charges gave way to dismounted combat where men would tie up their horses and fight on foot. When the American Civil War broke out in April 1861, neither the North (about 360,000 small arms) nor the South (about 240,000) had enough weapons to fight a major war. Stockpiles of rifles and handguns carried by individual soldiers were limited. As the war escalated those arms stockpiles were quickly diminished. Soldiers were often forced to use older smooth bore and flintlock muskets, which had been considered to be obsolete, simply because the newer rifles were not available in sufficient quantities. Many soldiers were forced to use their own personal hunting rifles, which were typically Kentucky or Pennsylvania type rifles. These rifles, while more accurate than smoothbore muskets, had been designed for hunting, and fired less deadly smaller caliber ammunition. To combat the arms shortage, the Union and Confederacy both had imported large quantities of rifles from Europe, with each side buying whatever they could get. The relatively poor South only bought 50,000 by August 1862, while the North bought 726,000. Accordingly, during the first two years of the war soldiers from both sides used a wide variety of rifles, including many that were over 50 years old and were considered obsolete. At the same time, Northern rifle and gun manufacturers such as Sharps, Colt, Remington, and the United States armory at Springfield, Massachusetts quickly increased their production of rifles;〔 Springfield alone increased its annual output from 20,000 to 200,000. The North was thus able to supply its own small arms needs while the South had to continue to rely on foreign sources, eventually purchasing 580,000 rifles. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Rifles in the American Civil War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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